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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This litigation involves three separate cases between the parties, the earliest dating back 
to 2012, regarding business ventures for the purchase and sale of heavy duty trucks and 
equipment. The parties reached a global settlement, and the terms were recited on the record in 
open court. Appellants ("Budget Truck Parties") refused to honor the settlement agreement and 
claimed fraud in the inducement in opposing Respondent Kent Tilley' s ("Kent") motion to 
enforce the settlement. The trial court issued an order enforcing the settlement agreement and 
entered a judgment against the Budget Truck Parties which is now the subject of this appeal. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Brek Pilling initiated a lawsuit against Kent Tilley on December 27, 2012, Cassia County 
Case No. CV-2012-1257. Aug. R. p. 1-5. Kent filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Third Party 
Claim on February 1, 2013, adding as defendants Jim Cottom and High Mark Rentals, LLC 
("Cottom Case"). Aug. R. p. 6-17. This case involved a dispute over ownership and use of 
certain heavy duty truck.s and equipment. Id. 
Budget Truck Sales, LLC, ("Budget Truck") filed a lawsuit against Kent on April 9, 
2013, Cassia County Case No. CV-2013-316. Aug. R. p. 28-34. Budget Truck alleged that Kent 
Tilley owed it money on an open account for loans it provided to Kent. Id. Kent filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim denying the debt and alleging Budget Truck owed him his share of the profits 
from the business venture to buy and sell heavy duty trucks, trailers, and equipment. Aug. R. p. 
30-43. 
Kent filed a lawsuit against Brek Pilling and Brian Tibbets on August 17, 2015, Cassia 
County Case No. CV-2015-719. Aug. R. p. 99-105. Kent alleged that he entered into a joint 
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venture agreement with Brek Pilling and Brian Tibbets to buy and sell heavy duty trucks, trailers, 
and equipment, and they personally owed him for his share of the profits from the venture which 
they turned into Budget Truck, 1 without Kent's knowledge or approval. Id. On October 8, 2015, 
the two cases involving the Budget Truck dispute were consolidated ("Consolidated Cases"). R. 
p. 19-20. 
On December 13, 2016, a trial on the Consolidated Cases commenced. R. p. 15. On the 
second day of trial, the parties reached a global settlement agreement ("Agreement") to resolve 
all three cases as well as some issues outside of the litigation. Tr. p. 1-16 (Dec. 14, 2016)2. Tilley 
filed a motion to enforce the settlement on January 23, 2017. Aug. R. p. 44-45. All three cases 
were consolidated for purposes of this motion. Tr. p. 14, L. 3-6. The trial court entered an Order 
enforcing the settlement and a Judgment on May 2, 2017. R. p. 124-129; Aug. R. p. 95-98. 
C. Statement of Facts 
After the parties reached a global resolution of all cases and disputes between them, the 
district court had the parties recite the material terms of their agreement on the record in open 
court to ensure that there was a binding and enforceable agreement before vacating the trial. Tr. 
p. 5, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 22 (Dec. 14, 2016). Prior to doing so, the court advised the parties as 
follows: 
' The members of Budget Truck Sales, LLC, are Brek Pilling, Brian Tibbets, and Mike Tilley. 
Aug. R. p. 29. Mike Tilley and Kent Tilley are brothers. 
2 There are three transcripts in the record: I) December 14, 2016, transcript from the trial when 
the parties recited the settlement terms on the record; 2) February 6, 2017, transcript of the 
hearing on Kent's motion to enforce the settlement; and 3) April 17, 2017, transcript of the 
hearing regarding the proposed judgment. The transcripts all begin with page number 1 and are 
not consecutively numbered. Therefore, citations to the transcripts each include the date of the 
transcript for easy reference. 
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THE COURT: ... So what I want the parties to know, or what I want to 
tell them how I'm going to envision this, I want to make sure they understand 
how this is going to work when we put this on the record, because I'm going to 
come back and ask you when this is done. 
Mr. McRae is going to recite terms of the stipulation and Mr. Schmitz is 
going to say, Yup, that's it, we agree, or there's some other things, whatever. 
When we get done I'm going to come back to each of the clients and I'm going to 
say, Is this your deal, Is this final, Do you give your attorney authority to enter 
into this stipulation. Do you understand that this is final as of today and you 
cannot add anything to this, you cannot take anything away? This is a done deal, 
this case will be dismissed based on this. 
And if you can go finalize your documents, that's what you should do. 
You should finalize your documents, get titles, deliver equipment, all those other 
things. But if you don't agree on the time of day after today, if you can't agree 
[on] any written documents or any other terms, this settles this case and this case 
is over on these terms. And whatever you disagree on, you might to have to come 
back to court and settle the disagreements, if you can't agree on anything else. But 
whatever you agree on today is done and final. 
And I'm going to ask each of you if that's what you intend and if that's 
what you want to happen. Do you understand that? I just want a nod of head that 
you understand how this is going to work. Mr. Tilley - Kent Tilley, do you 
understand? 
Tr. p. 3, L. 12 - p. 4, L. 16 (Dec. 14, 2016) (emphasis added). The material terms of the 
Agreement which were recited on the record are as follows: 
1. A $100,000 payment to Kent Tilley the day after the delivery of a CAT 950 
loader and a Clark loader, which were the subject of dispute in the Cottom 
Case, to a place designated by Brek Pilling. The remainder of the items in 
dispute in that case would be retained by Kent Tilley; 
2. $300,000 paid to Kent Tilley over a term of three (3) years, pursuant to a 
promissory note, and personally guaranteed by Budget Truck Sales, LLC, 
Brek Pilling, Mike Tilley and Brian Tibbets, with no interest and quarterly 
payments beginning February I, 2017; 
3. Kent Tilley to receive $6,000 being held by Schows pending production of the 
title for a 1997 Ford truck. Kent Tilley's attorney, Jeff Rolig, would prepare 
the necessary paperwork to obtain the title and Mr. McRae would sign any 
stipulation needed; 
4. Kent Tilley would immediately prepare the necessary documents to obtain a 
default judgment against Jim Cottom in the Cottom Case; 
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5. Kent Tilley would be entitled to receive the $24,500 being held by the Court 
in Case No. CV-2013-316; 
6. Kent Tilley would assume the debt owed by Budget Truck Sales, LLC, to 
June Tilley3; 
7. Kent Tilley agreed not to seek any civil remedy from Brandon Tilley4 for the 
vandalism of Kent's property; 
8. Budget Truck Sales, LLC, Brek Pilling, Brian Tibbets, and Mike Tilley would 
deliver any and all titles in their possession for Kent Tilley's personal trucks 
and equipment and if duplicate titles are needed, that would be worked out. 
Id. p. 5, L. 18 - p. 15, L. 22. After the terms were recited, the court asked each individual party 
and their attorneys if they stipulated to those terms, knowing that they could not add to nor 
subtract from them. The Court started with Mike Tilley and the following colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT: All right. Now let me start with - I don't care - Mike Tilley. Were 
you able to hear the agreement placed on the record by the attorneys? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Was there anything left out of that to your knowledge? 
MIKE TILLEY: No. 
THE COURT: Do you intend for this to be a full and final disposition of this 
case? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you give your attorney authority to enter into this 
stipulation on your behalf? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you understand the result of this is this case will be over and 
you cannot add anything to this agreement or take anything away from · this 
agreement. and at least as far as what's recited on the record, this case is - that's a 
final agreement. Do you understand that? 
'June Tilley is Mike and Kent's mother. 
4 Brandon Tilley is Mike's son. 
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MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: You might have documents to prepare and some stipulations and 
somethings to deliver and some other things to be done, but as far as you' re 
concerned this is over; am I right? 
MIKE TILLEY: Correct. 
Id., p. 9, L. 19-p. 10, L. 18 (emphasis added). The court had the same exchange with all of the 
parties, except Brek Pilling who was absent and for whom Mr. McRae was autho.rized to speak. 
Id.,p.12, L. 16-p.13,L. 3. 
Pursuant to the Agreement recited above, the very next day, December 15, 2016, Mr. 
Rolig, Kent's attorney in the Cottom Case, prepared and sent to Mr. McRae a proposed 
Stipulation for Order Directing Issuance of New Title for the Ford truck sold at Schows, along 
with a proposed Order Directing Issuance of New Title. R. p. 45-51. Also, pursuant to the 
Agreement, Mr. Rolig immediately filed a proposed Order for Entry of Default against Jim 
Cottom, which the district court signed on December 19, 2016. R. p. 271-272. 
On December 28, 2016, having received no response to his email, Mr. Rolig again sent a 
copy of the proposed Stipulation and Order to Mr. McRae to get a new title for the truck sold at 
Schows. Also on December 28, 2016, Mr. Schmitz requested from Mr. McRae certain 
information to include in the settlement documents, including the location for delivery of the 
loaders and how the $100,000 payment would be made to Kent Tilley. Mr. McRae responded 
that he would check with his clients and be in touch the next day. Aug. R. p. 53. 
On January 3, 2017, Mr. Schmitz again requested identification of the location for 
' 
delivery of the loaders and requested the specific amount Budget Truck Sales owed to June 
Tilley for inclusion in the settlement documents. Aug. R. p. 54-55. Even though Mr. McRae and 
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his clients had not provided any of the requested information, on January 4, 2017, Mr. Schmitz 
sent the proposed Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement ("Release") to Mr. McRae. Since 
Brek Pilling had not yet designated a location for delivery of the loaders, the location was 
identified in the Release as Kodiak America, which is where Mr. McRae had indicated on the 
record was to be the likely delivery site. Tr. p. 5, L. 19-24 (Dec. 14, 2016). Mr. McRae was 
further advised that if a response was not received by January I 0, 2017, it would be assumed that 
delivery to Kodiak America was acceptable and the loaders would be delivered by Thursday, 
January 12, 2017, making the first payment of$100,000 due by Friday, January 13, 2017. Aug. 
R. p. 56-58. Mr. McRae thereafter indicated that the loaders should be delivered to Budget Truck 
Sales' lot. Id. 
On January 6, 2017, Mr. Schmitz advised Mr. McRae that Kent Tilley would deliver the 
loaders to Budget Truck Sales on January 10, 2017. Aug. R. p. 59-60. As advised, the Clark 
loader was delivered to Budget Truck Sales on January 10, 2017. Also on January 10, 2017, Mr. 
McRae sent an email to Mr. Schmitz raising new issues that his clients would like to see 
addressed in the Release. Aug. R., p. 62. These new issues were: I) a non-disclosure provision; 
2) a representation that the loaders were in "workable condition"; 3) a no-contact provision; and 
4) a provision barring Kent from using the name "Budget" in any business. Id. 
On January 11, 2017, after the Clark loader had been delivered, Mr. McRae sent another 
email indicating that his clients were seeking a final written agreement before the loaders could 
be delivered and before they would submit payment. Aug. R. p. 63-64. As previously advised, 
the CAT 950 loader was already scheduled to be delivered and was in fact delivered to Budget 
Truck Sales on January 11, 2017. Id. Mr. McRae and his clients were referred to the Agreement 
placed on the record before the Court and advised that the loaders were being delivered pursuant 
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to that Agreement. Id. Mr. McRae was also reminded of the Court's numerous instructions to the 
parties that they could not add anything to the Agreement or take anything away from it. Id. Mr. 
Schmitz further advised that if payment of the $100,000 was not received by the following day, a 
motion to enforce the settlement agreement would be filed. Id. 
On January 12, 2017, even though both loaders had been delivered, the Budget Truck 
parties refused to pay Kent. Mr. McRae reiterated that his clients would not pay the $100,000 or 
proceed with the Agreement unless Kent agreed to the new additional terms demanded by his 
clients. Aug. R. p. 65-66. Mr. Schmitz again advised Mr. McRae that if his clients would not 
comply with the Agreement and pay the $100,000 by the next day, the matter would be brought 
to the court. Id. 
On January 13, 2017, Mr. McRae confirmed that his clients would not honor the 
Agreement. Aug. R. p. 69-70. These actions led to the motion and order enforcing the 
Agreement. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. When there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, should this Court 
support the finding that the condition of the CAT 950 loader was not a material term of the 
settlement agreement, given that the heavy burden of showing that the finding was clearly 
erroneous has not been met? 
B. When the circumstances of this case show there was no support to find the Budget Truck 
Parties justifiably relied upon any representation regarding the condition of the loaders and the 
condition of the loaders was not a material term of the settlement, should this Court uphold the 
trial court's ruling that the Budget Truck Parties failed to make a sufficient showing of fraud in 
the inducement as a matter oflaw. · 
C. Are the Budget Truck Parties estopped from arguing fraud in the inducement in seeking 
to rescind the settlement agreement when they individually agreed to the terms on the record and 
accepted all the benefits of the bargain? 
D. Is Kent Tilley entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The parties disagree on which standard applies to this appeal. The Budget Truck Parties 
assert that "A motion for the enforcement of a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for 
summary judgment when no evidentiary hearing has been conducted." Vanderford Co. v. 
Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 671, 249 P.3d 857, 864 (2011). However, the standard of review 
depends in part upon the procedural posture of the case. Goodman v. Lothrup, 143 Idaho 622, 
625, 151 PJd 818, 821 (2007). "In order to make that determination, it is first necessary to 
establish what sort of proceeding occurred below." Id., at 626, 822. Other cases that are more on 
point address enforcement of settlement agreements utilizing a "clearly erroneous" standard 
more akin to the appellate standard of review for evidentiary findings or findings of fact. This 
case is procedurally different from Vanderford and Goodman and the clearly erroneous standard 
should apply. 
In Vanderford, the parties attended a court ordered mediation. Vanderford Co. v. 
Knudson, 150 Idaho 664,667,249 P.3d 857, 860 (2011). Afterwards, Knudson filed a notice that 
mediation failed. Id. The other parties, Vanderford and Greifs, disagreed because they contended 
Knudson had granted Vanderford authority to negotiate a settlement and agreed to join in that 
settlement. Id., at 667-68, 860-61. The Greifs filed a motion to enforce the settlement and 
dismiss Knudson's claims under Rule 12(b)(6). /d., at 668, 861. The parties submitted opposing 
affidavits and the district court heard oral argument on the motions. Afterward, the district court 
found that Knudson and Vanderford reached a settlement that included, among other things, the 
assignment of Knudson's rights against the Greifs in the lawsuit to Vanderford. The court 
granted the Greifs' motion and dismissed Knudson's claims. Id., at 670, 863. Citing Goodman 
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for its similar procedural process, this Court indicated that the motion to enforce functioned as a 
motion to dismiss which, when the court considers material outside the pleadings, is treated as 
one for summary judgment. Id., at 671, 864. 
Goodman involved a property line dispute. The parties were ordered into mediation and 
appeared to have reached a settlement. Goodman 11. Lathrup, 143 Idaho at 624-25, 151 P.3d at 
820-21. Following mediation, one of the parties repudiated the agreement. Goodman filed a 
motion to enforce which the court initially denied, but granted on reconsideration. Id., at 625, 
821. On appeal, this Court distinguished the procedural posture of Goodman from Caballero v. 
Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1076 (2004). In Caballero, the district court ordered enforcement 
of a disputed mediation agreement after a bench trial to determine the validity and terms of that 
agreement. Caballero 11. Wikse, 140 Idaho at 332, 92 P.3d 1079; Goodman, 143 Idaho at 625, 
151 P.3d at 821. Because appellate review in Caballero followed a bench trial to determine the 
validity and terms of the agreement, it was appropriate to uphold the district court's findings of 
fact if they were not clearly erroneous. Goodman, 143 Idaho at 626, 151 P.3d at 822. However, 
unlike Caballero, in Goodman, the memorandum decision and order did not follow a trial, it 
followed a motion to enforce which functioned as a motion to dismiss under l.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
Id. 
Neither Vanderford nor Goodman are procedurally similar to this case because they did 
not involve a situation where the parties informed the court during trial that they reached a 
settlement and then recited the terms of the settlement on the record in open court. Instead, this 
case is procedurally more similar to Caballero, since reciting the settlement terms on the record 
and stipulating to them functioned as an evidentiary hearing on the terms of the agreement. 
Moreover, this case is factually and procedurally identical to Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 
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94, 44 P.3d 1149 (2002), and Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 888 P.2d 804 (Ct.App. 1995), 
where this Court and the Court of Appeals applied the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
In Kohring, the parties were members of a closely-held family corporation. Kohring v. 
Robertson, 137 Idaho at 95, 44 P.3d at 1150. A dispute arose pertaining to three parcels ofland, 
farm equipment, and some personal property. Id. At the time originally set for trial, the parties_ 
orally stipulated to a settlement agreement on the record in open court. Id., at 97, 1152. 
Kohring's attorney placed the parties' stipulation on the record with the Robertson's attorney 
clarifying one issue regarding water usage because the method of irrigation was of great 
importance. Id. Disputes arose between the parties as they attempted to reduce the agreement to 
writing. Id. The next month, Kohring filed a motion to enforce and clarify the settlement 
agreement. She argued that the Robertsons were not adhering to the stipulation as to how the 
land would be irrigated. Id. at 98, 1153. The district court heard oral argument on the motion and 
held that the stipulation pertaining to water usage was merely an "agreement to agree," because 
the intent of the parties was to enter a subsequent agreement. Id. The district court held the 
agreement was unenforceable, and a trial was held on the original claims. Id. 
On appeal, this Court used the following standard of review: 
"Findings of fact cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, 
i.e. not supported by substantial, competent evidence." Savage Lateral Ditch 
Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 241-42, 869 P.2d 554, 558-59 
(1993). Likewise, the "trial court's findings and conclusions which are based on 
substantial although conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal." Sun 
Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 
794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 
"the trial court's findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the 
judgment entered." Id. 
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Id., at 98-99, 1153-54 (quoting Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 687, 23 P.3d 147, 149 (2001)). 
Even though there was no evidentiary hearing or bench trial held specifically as to the 
enforcement of the settlement agreement, this Court used the clearly erroneous standard to 
reverse the district court and find that the settlement agreement was enforceable based upon the 
parties' stipulation on the record. Thus, the stipulation on the record functioned as an evidentiary 
hearing for purposes of determining the validity and terms of the parties' agreement. 
In Conley v. Whittesley, 126 Idaho 630, 888 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1995), the subject of the 
litigation was an easement located on Moscow Mountain conveyed to Conley. On the first day 
scheduled for trial, the parties advised the district court they had reached a settlement and set 
forth on the record the agreed upon terms. Conley, 126 Idaho at 632, 888 P.2d 806. The court 
vacated the trial and directed the parties to enter a written agreement within a reasonable time, or 
the court would set a new trial date. Id. After the parties failed to enter a written agreement, the 
court issued a sua sponte order directing the parties to show cause why they failed to execute a 
written agreement in conformity with the terms expressed on the record. Id. At the show cause 
hearing, Whittlesey indicated his proposed draft went beyond the scope of the pleadings and 
included more detail than the terms discussed on the record. Id. Conley submitted that the parties 
never said on the record that the agreement was final. Id. The district court concluded that the 
parties had entered a binding stipulation and ordered them to prepare a written agreement to 
conform with what had been placed on the record. Id. 
On appeal, with respect to the standard of review, the Court of Appeals stated: 
... we examine the transcript of the July 10, 1989, hearing to determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that the parties 
intended the settlement terms which were recited on the record to be their final 
agreement. We will defer to the district court's findings unless they are not 
supported by the evidence. 
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Id., at 634, 808. 
As in both Kohring and Conley, this case involves a situation in which the parties 
stipulated and recited the terms of their settlement on the record. When the parties tell the district 
court that they have reached a settlement and then place all the terms of that settlement on the 
record, with the individual parties affirming their stipulation on the record, it functions as an 
evidentiary hearing on the validity and terms of the agreement. In those situations, there is no 
need for the court to conduct another evidentiary hearing, nor does a summary judgment 
standard of review apply. Placing the terms of the settlement on the record allows the district 
court to make findings of fact based upon the representations placed on the record, and those 
findings should be upheld unless they are "clearly erroneous." Therefore, the Court should use 
the clearly erroneous standard to review the district court's decision. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
At the outset, it helps to understand what is NOT being challenged here, as it may be 
dispositive: I) the Budget Truck Parties are NOT challenging the enforceability of the 
Agreement, other than arguing fraud in the inducement as to the condition of the CAT 950 
loader; and 2) the Budget Truck Parties are NOT challenging the district court's finding that the 
condition of the CAT 950 loader was not a material term of the Agreement.5 Instead, they only 
challenge the district court's summary of the law on fraud in the inducement. However, the 
'These issues have never been raised, either in Appellants' Brief, or in front of the district court 
and, therefore, are waived on appeal. See Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224,229, 220 P.3d 580, 
585 (2009) ("It is well established that a litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during 
a trial and later raise objections for the first time on appeal."); Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 
790, 229 P.3d 1146, I 152 (2010) ("We will not consider an issue not 'supported by argument 
and authority in the opening brief."'). 
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district court's order enforcing the settlement, and the judgment, should be affirmed for four 
reasons: I) there is substantial evidence to support the district court's ruling that the condition of 
the loader was not a material term of the Agreement; 2) the district court's ruling on fraud in the 
inducement was correct under the circumstances; 3) the Budget Truck Parties failed to challenge 
all of the bases for the district court's ruling; and 4) the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars the 
Budget Truck Parties from claiming that the condition of the loader was a material term of the 
Agreement recited on the record, 
A. The trial court's order enforcing the Agreement and its judgment should be upheld 
because there is substantial, competent evidence to support its finding that the 
condition of the CAT 950 loader was not a material term. 
Before the parties placed their stipulated terms on the record, the court cautioned and 
advised them that it was going to be their one and only opportunity to set forth all the material 
terms of their Agreement. Afterwards, they would not be able to add or subtract from the 
stipulated Agreement. 
TI-IE COURT: ... So what I want the parties to know, or what I want to 
tell them how I'm going to envision this, I want to make sure they understand 
how this is going to work when we put this on the record, because I'm going to 
come back and ask you when this is done. 
Mr. McRae is going to recite terms of the stipulation and Mr. Schmitz is 
going to say, Yup, that's it, we agree, or there's some other things, whatever. 
When we get done I'm going to come back to each of the clients and I'm going to 
say, Is this your deal, is this final, Do you give your attorney authority to enter 
into this stipulation, Do you understand that this is final as of today and you 
cannot add anything to this. you cannot take anything away? This this is a done 
deal, this case will be dismissed based on this. 
And if you can go finalize your documents, that's what yoti should do. 
You should finalize your documents, get titles, deliver equipment, all those other 
things. But if you don't agree on the time of day after today, if you can't agree 
[on] any written documents or any other terms, this settles this case and this case 
is over on these terms. And whatever you disagree on, you might to have to come 
back to court and settle the disagreements, if you can't agree on anything else. But 
whatever you agree on today is done and final. 
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And I'm going to ask each of you if that's what you intend and if that's 
what you want to happen. Do you understand that? I just want a nod of head that 
you understand how this is going to work. Mr. Tilley - Kent Tilley, do you 
understand? · 
Tr. p. 3, L. 12-p. 4, L. 16 (Dec. 14, 2016) (emphasis added). Mr. McRae then recited the terms 
of the Agreement to the Court, as set forth in the Statement of Facts above. Id. at p. 5, L. 18 - p 
15, L. 22. The Budget Truck Parties' argument on appeal is that Kent misrepresented the 
condition of the CAT 950 loader, which was just one of the two loaders he was to deliver, and 
which was only one aspect of the Agreement. They contend the district court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing on the alleged misrepresentation so they could rescind the Agreement. 
Appellants' Brief, p. 6, 10. According to the Budget Truck Parties, Kent supposedly represented 
that the loader "worked great" and was in "great working condition." Appellants' Brief, p. 10. 
This is itself a misrepresentation of the Budget Truck Parties' position prior to this appeal. Prior 
to the appeal, the Budget Truck Parties claimed that Kent advised Mr. McRae that the loader had 
some hydraulic problems, but that Kent would repair those problems and deliver the loader in 
working condition. On the same day that Kent delivered the first loader, the Clark loader, Mr. 
McRae sent an email requesting new and additional terms be added to the draft Release. Aug. R. 
p. 62. One of those new terms pertained to the condition of the loaders. Mr. McRae stated: 
During settlement discussions, Kent represented to me that there were 
improvements that he could easily make to the loaders. In particular, he stated that 
there were some "hydraulic issues" that he could easily cure. As such, we would 
like a representation as to the condition of the loaders upon delivery, that they are 
in workable condition. 
Id. This was the Budget Truck Parties' first description of Kent's alleged representation.6 
6 Kent denies making any representation that the loaders were in great working condition or that 
he would make any repairs or improvements to the loaders. Aug. R. p. 63, 65, 69. 
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This is far from Kent representing that the loaders were in "great working condition" and 
is clearly an after-thought request, not something that was material to the Agreement. By Mr. 
McRae's own statement, Kent did not represent the loader was "working great" or in "great 
working condition." The alleged representation was that he could make some "improvements" to 
the loaders, and that there were some "hydraulic issues." At most, this would be an indication 
that Kent would be willing to make some improvements or repairs, not that the loader was 
working great. It was not until after the CAT 950 loader was delivered that Mr. McRae changed 
the alleged representation to Kent informing him that the CAT 950 "would be in working order 
with just some simple hydraulic issues that he would fix." Aug. R. p. 68. Then the allegation 
changed to Kent representing that the CAT 950 was "working great" with only "a minor 
hydraulic issue" that Kent assured Mr. McRae would be fixed before delivering the loader. Aug. 
R. p. 66. Now, apparently, the representation has become that the loader already "worked great" 
and "was in great working condition." Appellants' Brief, p. 2. 
Not only did Kent's alleged misrepresentation evolve over time, but that evolution 
actually supports the conclusion that the condition of the loaders was not a material part of the 
Agreement recited to the court. Mike Tilley asserted in his affidavit to the district court that had 
the Budget Truck Parties known the CAT 950 was not in working condition, they would not 
have entered the Agreement. R. p. 152. If that is true, then the condition of the CAT 950 would 
have been one of, if not the most, material term of the Agreement to them. If that is also true, 
then the condition precedent that Kent repair the loader and deliver it in working condition 
should have been important enough for the Budget Truck Parties to put that requirement on the 
record as a material term. This is especially so considering the court's warning that the parties 
would not be able to add or change the terms in any way, that the case would be settled on the 
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terms recited, and considering that the alleged fraudulent statement was made prior to placing the 
terms of the Agreement on the record. The condition of the loaders was never mentioned as a 
material term on the record. Instead, the Budget Truck Parties all individually affirmed that all 
Kent had to do was "deliver" the loaders that were in his possession. The discussion regarding 
the loaders was as follows: 
MR. MCRAE: Budget Truck Sales will pay the sum of $400,000 to Kent 
Tilley. The first $100,000 payment will be made the day after the delivery - and 
this involves that other case - a CAT 950 loader and a Clark loader, to a place 
designated by Brek Pilling. I believe it will be at the Kodiak America lot here in 
Burley. 
The remaining $300,000 will be paid over a term of three years, pursuant 
to a promissory note, personally guaranteed by Budget Truck Sales, Brek Pilling, 
Mike Tilley and Brian Tibbets. Did I also say at one percent? Amortized over a 
period of three years at one percent. 
MR MCRAE: Yes. There's one other term in the 1257 case. I had 
mentioned the CAT 950 loader and the Clark loader going to Brek Pilling. The 
remainder of the items there, as I recall there's about ten other items of 
significantly less value, will go to - or Mr. Tilley will be able to retain those 
items: Kent Tilley. 
lHE COURT: All other equipment in the 1257 case except for the Clark 
loader and the 950 loader go to Mr. Kent Tilley; is that right? 
MR. MCRAE: Correct. Two other terms -
lHE COURT: And Mr. Kent Tilley is going to deliver that Clark loader 
and the 950 loader and that's when the payment's going to start. 
MR. MCRAE: That's correct. That's when the $100,000 will be paid 
within the next day, 
Tr. p. 5, L. 19 - p. 6, L. 4; p. 7, L. 18 -p. 8, L. 7 (Dec. 14, 2016). At no point was it mentioned 
that Kent would repair the loaders or that he would deliver them in great working condition. 
With respect to the equipment, this Agreement was a division of assets. Brek was getting the 
loaders and Kent was getting the rest of the items in dispute. The agreement that Kent was 
simply going to deliver the loaders was affirmed by all parties. They all also affirmed that 
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nothing was left out of the terms as recited by their attorney. The court started with Mike Tilley 
and the following colloquy occurred: 
THE COURT: All right. Now let me start with - I don't care - Mike Tilley. Were 
you able to hear the agreement placed on the record by the attorneys? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes 
THE COURT: Was there anything left out of that to your knowledge? 
MIKE TILLEY: No. 
TIIE COURT: Do you intend for this to be a full and final disposition of this 
case? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you give your attorney authority to enter into this 
stipulation on your behalf? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you understand the result of this is this case will be over and 
you cannot add anything to this agreement or take anything away from this 
agreement, and at least as far as what's recited on the record, this case is -that's a 
final agreement. Do you understand that? 
MIKE TILLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: You might have documents to prepare and some stipulations and 
somethings to deliver and some other things to be done, but as far as you're 
concerned this is over; am I right? 
MIKE TILLEY: Correct. 
Id., p. 9, L. 18 - p, I 0, I. 18 ( emphasis added). The court carefully had the same exchange 
with all of the parties, except Brek Pilling who was absent, and for whom Mr. McRae was 
authorized to speak. Id., p. 12, L. 16 - p. 13, L. 3. All of the parties represented to the court that 
they agreed with the terms of the Agreement and that they understood it was a final agreement of 
the terms which they could not later add to or alter. Id., p. 9, L. 18 -p. 15, L. 6. Not only was the 
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condition of the loaders never mentioned as a term, neither was the affirmative duty of repairing 
or improving the loaders; only delivery of the loaders. 
This presentation of facts is not intended to highlight the dispute between the parties, or 
emphasize an issue of fact. Instead, it is intended to present the information available to the 
district court, and to show that based on all the evidence presented to it, there was substantial and 
competent evidence to support its conclusion. Even if later evidence may have been submitted in 
the form of an affidavit to attempt to show a dispute, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to 
determine that the evidence did not show reliance or that the dispute did not involve a material 
term of the AgreemenJ. Based upon the evidence, the district court found that the condition of the 
loaders to be delivered was not a material term of the settlement. 
They clearly were not made a condition -the condition of the loaders was clearly 
not made part of the settlement in court. The settlement in court was represented' 
to be the full, final, concluded agreement between the parties. "You can't add 
anything to this. You can't take away anything from this. Do you under[ stand] 
that?" "Yes, I do." "Do you wish that to be final and binding on you as of now?" 
"Yes, I do." 
So I find that the condition of loaders was not made a material term of this 
contract, and ifl allowed further litigation on that point, it would be adding a term 
to the contract that was not agreed to and was not placed in the final settlement 
agreement placed on the record. To me, the contract placed on the record was 
done, it was final, it was concluded, and it was concluded on the terms placed on 
the record and that settled and dismisses all the litigation, and the parties cannot 
add the condition of the loaders as a material term. They didn't do it when they 
had the chance; they can't do it now. That's going to be my ruling. 
Tr. p. 60, L. 24- p. 61, L. 6; p. 61, L. 15 -p. 62, L. I (Feb. 6, 2017). These findings of fact are 
not clearly erroneous. They are supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the district court's 
order enforcing the settlement and Judgment should be affirmed. 
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B. The trial court did not err in ruling that there was no fraud in the inducement 
under the circumstances of this case. 
The trial court ruled that the showing made was "insufficient as a matter of law in my 
view to show fraud in the inducement." Tr. p. 60, LL 4-5. While the Budget Truck Parties argue 
that the trial court's characterization of the circumstances where fraud can be shown was too 
limited, citingAdvance-Rumely Thresher Co., v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 4. P.2d 160 (1931), the 
trial court's ruling is easily supported by reviewing the elements of fraud. The elements of fraud 
are as follows: 
(I) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge 
of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by 
the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
Aspiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830, 832 (2003). Even though the trial court 
did not cite all of these tenns in its discussion, it did refer to the element of reliance on a false 
representation, Tr. p. 59, and alluded to the element of justifiable reliance in making this ruling. 
Essentially the trial court ruled that there was no support for any finding of justifiable reliance 
upon any representation regarding the condition or repair of the loaders because the settlement 
on the record, negotiated by parties who were represented by counsel, did not include any 
reference to the alleged representation. Even if the Court is persuaded by the Budget Truck 
Parties' argument that the trial court improperly characterized when fraud in the inducement can 
occur, the decision finding no fraud as a matter of law can be affinned because the trial court 
used the correct elements of fraud in finding that fraud did not exist as a matter of law. This 
Court has upheld a lower court finding as a matter of law on the element of reliance/justifiable 
reliance where the circumstances of the case indicate no inferences of reliance could be made. 
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See Gray v. Tri-Way Construction Services, 147 Idaho 378, 210 P.3d 63 (2009); King v. Lang, 
136 Idaho 905, 911, 42 P.3d 698 (2002), 
Furthermore, to show fraud in the inducement, the Budget Truck Parties must show that 
the condition or repair of the loaders was a material term of the Agreement. In addition to 
addressing the element of justifiable reliance, the district court also addressed the element of 
materiality and found that the condition or repair of the loaders was not a material term. The 
Budget Truck Parties do not challenge the district court's finding that the condition of the loaders 
was not a material term of the settlement, and since materiality of the term is a necessary element 
of fraud, as a matter of law they cannot prove fraud in the inducement. Therefore, the district 
court's ruling and judgment should be affirmed. 
C. Even if the snmmary judgment standard applies, the district court's ruling must be 
affirmed because the Budget Truck Parties failed to challenge all the bases for the 
court's ruling. 
As pointed out above, the Budget Truck Parties failed to address any issue or finding of 
materiality on appeal. The only error asserted by the Budget Truck Parties is that the district 
court erred by allegedly limiting the circumstances in which fraud in the inducement may be 
found. Appellants' Brief, p. 6. However, that was only one part of the district court's ruling. The 
district court also ruled that the condition of the loaders was not a material term of the 
Agreement. Tr. p. 61-62 (Feb. 6, 2017). The Budget Truck Parties do not discuss or challenge 
this portion of the court's ruling. 
This Court recently explained: 
This Court has held that when a district court grants summary judgment on 
multiple independent grounds, the appellant must successfully challenge all of 
those grounds to prevail on appeal. For example, in Weisel v. Beaver Springs 
Owners Ass 'n, Inc., the plaintiff sought to rescind a contract on the ground of 
mutual mistake. 152 Idaho 519,524,272 P.3d 491,496 (2012). The district court 
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granted summary judgment for the defendant on two alternative grounds; first, 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed and the claim was without merit, and 
second, that the mutual mistake claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. 
at 525, 272· P.3d at 497. We held that "an appellant's failure to address an 
independent ground for a grant of summary judgment is fatal to the appeal." and 
declined to consider the claim. Id. at 525-26, 272 P.3d at 497-98 (citing Andersen 
v. Prof'! Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 746, 118 P.3d 75, 78 (2005)). Even 
if the appellant shows that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
on some of the grounds, the judgment must be affirmed on the grounds not 
properly appealed. Andersen, 141 Idaho at 746, 118 P.3d at 78 ("[T]he fact that 
one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded 
if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds.") (citation 
omitted). Thus. if an appellant fails to contest all of the grounds upon which a 
district court based its grant of summary judgment. the judgment must be 
affirmed. 
AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159,164,307 P.3d 176, 181 (2013) (emphasis 
added). As quoted in section A, in addition to indicating its understanding of fraud in the 
inducement, the district court also ruled that the condition of the loaders was not a material term 
of the settlement. "So I find that the condition of the loaders was not made a material term of this 
contract ... That's going to be my ruling." Tr. p. 61, L. 15 -p. 62, L.l (Feb. 6, 2017). The Budget 
Truck Parties have not challenged that ruling. They failed to show how or why the district court 
was wrong in concluding that the condition of the loaders was not a material term. Since the 
Budget Truck Parties failed to challenge all the bases for the court's ruling, the order enforcing 
the settlement and the judgment must be affirmed. 
D. The Budget Truck Parties should be estopped from claiming that the condition of 
the CAT 950 loader was a material term of the Agreement. 
Quasi-estoppel provides a fourth basis to affirm the district court's ruling. The Budget 
Truck Parties agreed to a global settlement and avoided completing the trial on the Consolidated 
Cases which saved them time, attorney fees, and a potentially larger adverse jury verdict. The 
Budget Truck Parties' own attorney recited the terms of the Agreement to the trial court. The 
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Budget Truck Parties individually affirmed on the record that all of the material terms had been 
properly presented to the court. If the condition or repair of the CAT 950 loader was a material 
term of the Agreement, it should have been placed on the record. It was not. The Budget Truck 
Parties then accepted all the benefits of the bargain, causing significant prejudice and hardship to 
Kent. They should not be allowed to now change their position and argue that the condition of 
the loader was material in order to avoid paying Kent the hundreds of thousands of dollars owed 
to him. 
"The doctrine of quasi-estoppel 'prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable 
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing 
positions."' Silicon Intern. Ore., LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 549, 314 P.3d 593, 604 
(2013) (quoting Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,437, 80 P.3d 1031, 1038 (2003)). 
[Quasi-estoppel] prevents a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine applies 
where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position with 
one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. The act of the party 
against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself 
or produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel 
must have been induced to change his position. 
Id. (quoting E. Idaho Agric, Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402,410, 987 P.2d 314, 322 
(1999)). 
The Budget Truck Parties took the position on December 14, 2016, that the material 
i 
terms of the Agreement were those recited on the record in open court. The terms of the 
Agreement required performance by both parties. It required Kent to perform the following: 
1. Kent's attorney, Jeff Rolig, to prepare the necessary paperwork to obtain title 
for a 1997 Ford truck, for which Schow's was withholding $6,000; 
2. Immediately prepare the necessary documents to obtain a default judgment 
against Jim Cottom in Case No. CV-2012-1257; 
3. Assume the debt owed by Budget Truck Sales, LLC, to June Tilley, which 
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was estimated at between $40,000 - $50,000; and 
4. Not seek any civil remedy from Brandon Tilley for the vandalism of Kent's 
property; and 
5. Deliver a CAT 950 loader and a Clark loader to a place designated by Brek 
Pilling. . 
Tr. p. 5, L. 18-p. 15, L. 22 (Dec. 14, 2016). 
The Budget Truck Parties were required to do the following: 
Id. 
I. Pay Kent $100,000 the day after delivery of a CAT 950 loader and Clark 
loader; 
2. Pay Kent $300,000 over three (3) years pursuant to a promissory note 
personally guaranteed by Budget Truck, Brek Pilling, Mike Tilley, and Brian 
Tibbets; 
3. Sign any stipulation needed to obtain title to a I 997 Ford truck so the $6,000 
held by Schow' s could be released to Kent; and 
4. Deliver all titles in their possession for Kent's personal truck and equipment. 
Kent performed each and every one of his obligations. Mr. Rolig prepared a proposed 
Stipulation for Order Directing Issuance of New Title for the Ford truck the very next day and 
sent it to the Budget Truck Parties' attorney. R. p. 45-51. Mr. Rolig also immediately filed a 
proposed Order for Entry of Default against Jim Cottom, which the Court signed on December 
19, 2016. R. p. 271-272. A proposed Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement was sent to the 
Budget Truck Parties' attorney on January 4, 2017. Aug. R. p. 61. Kent assumed the debt owed 
to June Tilley. The loaders were delivered on January 10 and 11, 2017. Aug. R. p. 62-64. After 
the first loader was delivered the Budget Truck Parties demanded that Kent agree to four new 
terms that were not recited on the record on December 14, 2016, before the Budget Truck Parties 
would perform their obligations. These new terms were: I) a non-disclosure provision; 2) a 
representation that the loaders were in "workable condition"; 3) a no-contact provision; and 4) a 
provision barring Kent from using the name "Budget" in any business. Aug. R. p. 62. Even 
though Kent had completed his obligations under the Agreement, the Budget Truck Parties 
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refused to perform any of their previously agreed upon obligations unless Kent would agree to 
these new terms. Aug. R. p. 65-55, 69-70. They held Kent's payments hostage in order to force 
him to agree upon new, and umeasonable, material terms. 
The Budget Truck Parties obtained the benefit of everything they bargained for in the 
Agreement with Kent. However, after receiving these benefits, they changed their position from 
the one stated on the record in open court. They refused to perform their obligations unless Kent 
agreed to additional, umeasonable, and onerous terms. Then, when Kent moved to enforce the 
, Agreement as recited on the record, the Budget Truck Parties alleged fraud in the inducement in 
order to rescind the Agreement to avoid paying Kent. This is unconscionable conduct, causing 
Kent significant disadvantage. He agreed to end the trial on the Consolidated Cases, he no longer 
has possession of the two loaders, a default was obtained against Jim Cottom, he assumed the 
June Tilley debt which he cannot pay without payment from the Budget Truck Parties, and he 
continues to incur attorney fees and expenses trying to force the Budget Truck Parties to honor 
their Agreement. 
The Budget Truck Parties are asserting the right to argue that the condition of the CAT 
950 loader was material to the Agreement. That position is inconsistent with their statements to 
the court on the record. They changed their position after receiving all the benefits of the 
settlement. By taking this inconsistent position they have caused Kent to suffer a significant 
disadvantage. It would be unconscionable to allow the Budget Truck Parties to now claim that 
the condition of the CAT 950 loader was a material term of the Agreement when they did not 
make that claim at the time all the material terms were recited on the record. 
The trial court did not rule on this argument when granting Kent's motion to enforce the 
settlement, but the argument was raised in oral argument. Tr. p. 43, L. 13 - p. 45, L. 8 (Feb. 6, 
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2017). Kent did not have time to brief this issue to the trial court because appellants did not 
respond to Kent's motion to enforce until Friday, February 3, 2017, and the hearing was held on 
Monday, February 6, 2017. Since the argument was raised below, it is appropriate for this Court 
to consider it on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court has regularly stated that, 
A respondent on appeal is not necessarily limited to the issues decided by the 
trial court or the issues raised by the appellant. The respondent can seek to 
sustain a judgment for reasons that were presented to the trial court even though 
they were not addressed or relied upon by the trial court in its decision. 
Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling, 153 Idaho 735,742,291 PJd 418,425 (2012). Thus, even 
though the district court did not determine whether estoppel applied to prevent the Budget Truck 
Parties from taking a contrary position to the one they took on December 14, 2016, Kent asks 
this Court to address this issue on appeal. 
E. Kent Tilley is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5) and 41, Kent respectfully requests an award 
of his attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. Kent agrees with the 
Budget Truck Parties that the gravamen of these lawsuits involved commercial transactions and, 
therefore, if the Court finds that Kent is the prevailing party, he is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees on appeal. LC. § 12-120(3); Taylor v. Riley, 2017 WL 4228860, _ P.3d _ (Sept. 
25, 2017); Cummings v. Stephens, 157 Idaho 348,367,336 PJd 281,300 (2014). 
Also, under Idaho Code § 12-121, this Court will award attorney fees when a party's 
claims are "frivolous or unsupported by argument or authority." Hopper v. Swinerton, 155 Idaho 
801, 812,317 PJd 698, 709 (2013) (quoting McLean v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 
432, 283 PJd 742, 749 (2012)). In this case, the Budget Truck Parties only challenged the trial 
court's summary as to how fraud in the inducement applies in certain circumstances. However, 
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the Budget Truck Parties completely ignored and failed to challenge by argwnent or authority the 
trial court's ultimate finding which was that the condition of the loaders was not a material term 
of the Agreement recited on the record in open court back on December 14, 2016. There is no 
argument, factually or legally, that the court erred in finding that the condition of the loaders was 
not a material term of the Agreement. The Budget Truck Parties have kept all the benefits of that 
Agreement without complying with any of their obligations. This appeal is nothing more than a 
tactic for the Budget Truck Parties to delay or avoid paying Kent the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars owed him under the Agreement. For those reasons, the Budget Truck Parties have 
frivolously pursued this appeal and Kent should be awarded his attorney fees on appeal under 
Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
F. Appellants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, 
The Budget Truck Parties ask the Court to award them attorney fees on appeal. 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 10- 11. However, even if the Budget Truck Parties prevail oil appeal, they 
will not necessarily be the prevailing party. The Budget Truck Parties request fees under Idaho 
Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.7 Both Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 only allow a 
"prevailing party" to obtain attorney fees. However, the determination of prevailing party status 
is not made under these statutes, but instead under the instructions of I.R.C.P. 54. "Idaho Rule of 
7 To the extent a request is made for attorney fees under I.A.R. 35 and/or 41, those rules do not 
establish a substantive right to attorney fees, but instead, only establish the process for requesting 
fees under other sources. See Commer. Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Tr., 145 
Idaho 208,219, 177 P.3d 955,966 (2008); Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 
354, 365, 93 P.3d 685, 696 (2004). 
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Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) guides a court's inquiry on the prevailing party question." Idaho 
Military Historical Soc'y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624,630,329 P.3d 1072, 1078 (2014).8 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) states that fees are only allowed, "when provided for by any statute or 
contract." Fees are to be processed in the same way as costs. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5). When 
determining who is the prevailing party for purposes of costs, the prevailing party analysis 
includes consideration of, "the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief 
sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Because the issue before this court 
involves the enforcement of a settlement agreement, there are no amended pleadings or new 
causes of action. Unlike Kent, where affirmance would result in him being awarded payment 
under the Judgment, a best-case scenario for the Budget Truck Parties would result in a remand 
to the district court. Such result would not be the end of the case. Even if the Budget Truck 
Parties prevailed on appeal, until that remand was resolved, it would be impossible to determine 
who was the prevailing party on an overall basis. 
Idaho appellate courts have addressed similar cases before. In Evans v. Sawtooth 
Partners, the Court of Appeals stated, 
The parties have requested costs and attorney fees on appeal. The partnership 
clearly has prevailed on the deficiency question, but the ultimate allocation of 
costs and attorney fees at the trial level awaits a final determination on remand. 
We cannot yet say whether the partnership should be deemed the prevailing party 
as to the totality of issues presented on appeal. 
Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 388, 723 P.2d 925,932 (Ct. App. 1986). In Cox. v. 
City of Sandpoint, after summary judgment order was vacated and the case was remanded, the 
Court of Appeals stated, 
' See also Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125 (2009); Eighteen Mile 
Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). 
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Both parties request an award for attorney fees on appeal. Cox is the prevailing 
party on appeal but it remains to be seen whether Cox will be the prevailing party 
in the action, and, therefore, entitled to attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3) and 
I.A.R. '41. The district court, upon final resolution of the case, may consider fees 
incurred on appeal when it makes an award to the prevailing party. 
Cox v. City of Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 133, 90 P.3d 352,358 (Ct. App. 2003). In this case, a 
similar result should occur. Because a prevailing party must be determined, and the Budget 
Truck Parties cannot be a prevailing party from an overall basis as required by I.R.C.P. 
54(d)(l)(B) until the case reaches a resolution, the Budget Trucks Parties should not be awarded 
fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reason, Kent Tilley respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district comt's order enforcing the settlement and the court's judgment. Kent Tilley also 
respectfully requests that this Court award him his attorneys' fees incurred in responding to this 
appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13 th day ofNovember, 2017. 
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